The Hampdens On Foucault

“I’m wasting my life just hiding under the pretence of Foucault” – The Hampdens, ‘Phillip Johnson Homes’.

Sermonette VIII

Virtue supposes liberty, as the carrying of a burden supposes active force. Under coercion there is no virtue, and without virtue there is no religion. Make a slave of me, and I shall be no better for it. Even the sovereign has no right to use coercion to lead men to religion, which by its nature supposes choice and liberty. My thought is no more subject to authority than is sickness or health.

- Voltaire: "Canon Law: Ecclesiastical Ministry," Questions sur l'Encyclopédie (1771).

Question On The Rigour Of Analytic And Humanistic Philosophy

Thinking about responding to Mr Pender’s recent post – ‘On allegory and meaning’ – I considered the use of allegory and analogy (I’ll agree that, as techniques, they have their place, though I often wonder if they are used when other techniques may have conveyed their message more precisely [which seems to imply that I think less of them than other techniques, though I can think of no legitimate basis for this position]).

This set me wondering on a different question; why is it that ‘analytic’ philosophy is considered more rigorous? Perhaps this perception is purely subjective (it was part of my initial response to Mr Pender), but their seems to be a general view that analytic philosophy is more intellectually rigorous in its arguments and presentations than ‘humanistic’ (or continental, if you will) philosophy. Is there that much of distinction – in terms of rigour – between high calibre works in either tradition? Or is it simply a bias on the part of the anglophile/Anglophone analytic tradition?

[Cross-posted at Dialectic.]

Vale's Slippery Slope

This story about a statement by Dana Vale was on the news tickers this morning.

At it’s crux runs this interesting slippery slope argument:

I) If control of RU486 (an abortion drug) is taken from the Government (and given to the Therapeutic Goods Administration), then Australian will become a Muslim nation.

II) Becoming a Muslim nation is ethically impermissible (which seems to be analogous to ‘taking a step towards NAZI Germany’ – ‘The NAZI Analogy’ – in this argument).

III) Therefore, the Government should maintain control of RU486.

I really think that the argument overplays its hand …

Islam And Taboos

“Muslim leaders say the cartoons are not just offensive. They're blasphemy--the mother of all offenses [sic]. That's because Islam forbids any visual depiction of the Prophet, even benign ones. Should non-Muslims respect this taboo? I see no reason why. You can respect a religion without honoring [sic] its taboos. I eat pork, and I'm not an anti-Semite. As a Catholic, I don't expect atheists to genuflect before an altar. If violating a taboo is necessary to illustrate a political point, then the call is an easy one. Freedom means learning to deal with being offended.

Blasphemy, after all, is commonplace in the West. In America, Christians have become accustomed to artists' offending their religious symbols. They can protest, and cut off public funding--but the right of the individual to say or depict offensive messages or symbols is not really in dispute. Blasphemy, moreover, is common in the Muslim world, and sanctioned by Arab governments. The Arab media run cartoons depicting Jews and the symbols of the Jewish faith with imagery indistinguishable from that used in the Third Reich. But I have yet to see Jews or Israelis threaten the lives of Muslims because of it.”

The above is from Andrew Sullivan’s essay, ‘Your Taboo, Not Mine’ in Time, on the reaction to the Danish cartoons. My attention was drawn to the point ‘freedom means learning to deal with being offended’ – it is a point a couple of commentators have made – and one worth considering …

Question On The Critique Of Islam

A series of cartoons, published in the Danish paper Jyllands-Posten, and the response by Muslims has been receiving media attention (an article from spiked).

The commentary has been examining free-speech, the oft claimed right to free-speech, and how that right sits in relation to religious tolerance.

The point I have been pondering, for the past couple of hours, is whether or not in a post modern era (especially if post modernism is conceived as a process of critiquing), the capacity to engage in critique should be defended? As such, should the cartoons be defended because they are critiques that need to be answered rather than bluntly opposed?

At present, I think any ‘right’ to free-speech – be it explicit or implicit in the law of a community – must include the capacity to critique the views and positions expressed by others … Am interested in other's thoughts on this position.

On Spigelman’s ‘Address To The Annual Opening Of Law Term Dinner Of The Law Society Of New South Wales’

“In the Western tradition, civility has long been accepted as a public virtue manifest in signs of respect to strangers in language, etiquette and in tempering the assertion of self-interest.

This public virtue assumes that there are broadly accepted rules for conduct: a system of public morality reflecting the core values of our society, particularly the respect for the freedom and personal autonomy of others …

There does, however, appear to be a growing concern with personal conduct in many areas of discourse: the emergence of road-rage; the behaviour of parents at school sporting events, referred to as the “ugly parent syndrome”; the prevalence of offensive language in many spheres of social interaction and popular culture; the sensationalism of a media driven by declining circulations and audiences; the indifference to the tranquillity of others by the infliction of noise, whether from boorish conduct or mobile phones; the vulgarity and rudeness of reality TV shows; the selfishness of littering; the virtual disappearance in common discourse of words such as “please”, “thank you” and “sorry”.

Criminal behaviour is not the only form of conduct to which a zero tolerance response may be appropriate.

In a complex society such as ours relationships of civility, tolerance and trust cannot be established or maintained only on the basis of interpersonal relationships. They must be institutionalised.”

The above extract is from an address made, on the 30th of January, by the Chief Justice of New South Wales. The ‘concern’ regarding the decline in ‘personal conduct’ has been picked up in the media, with a web-poll claiming a majority of respondents agreed that Australia is a “ruder, more vulgar society than 20 years ago”.

The questions I find myself asking is what constitutes ‘public virtue’, and whether it has the place that has been claimed for it?

Philosopher’s Carnival, No. Twenty Five

The 25th Philosopher’s Carnival is being hosted by The Uncredible Hallq.

I’ve not had time to read through the posts, but this carnival appears diverse which is a good thing.

On ‘The clock shows the wrong time’

In the absence of anything much here of late – I, personally, apologise and lay the blame on the first volume of the Foundations of Law reader that I have to demolish prior to my intensive – Reader’s attention is drawn to a new discussion being hosted at Dialectic, Epideixis’ kin, commenced by Ol’Merciless on “the nature of time”.

[The lack of method and ‘immature’ tone of the debate which will emerge when the reach of the participants extends beyond their grasp is not condoned, but the notice is given in the interests of promoting philosophical discussion.]