Question On Philosophers And Imprisonment
An Iranian philosopher – Ramin Jahanbegloo – is presently imprisoned (apparently in solitary confinement). (On Jahanbegloo, a collection of his papers and an interview with Postel.)
While there is a tradition of philosophers being imprisoned – Socrates springs to mind – it seems somewhat discordant with the state of the discipline at present. This raises an interesting question – are there any views that, as a philosopher, you would be prepared to endure imprisonment for?
While there is a tradition of philosophers being imprisoned – Socrates springs to mind – it seems somewhat discordant with the state of the discipline at present. This raises an interesting question – are there any views that, as a philosopher, you would be prepared to endure imprisonment for?
posted by MH at 8:41 am
10 Comments:
Well, you both probably know that the complete abolition of four wheel drives and dogs would make me very happy and if that required some time behind bars, then sure, why not.
The real question is: is there anything that I could support that would threaten the authorities to require my incarceration? It would currently appear to be unlikely in Australia. The closest we have to an ideological prisoner that I can think of is David Hicks, but I’m not sure if he exactly fits the bill of philosophical subversive.
To address this question, I have devised four ranks of philosophical imprisonment, though this might be expanded or the hierarchy questioned.
Bertie: Incarcerated for philosophical protest or reasons of conscience, ultimately you will be released and pose no real threat, but you made your point to the small number who might take note of you.
Gramsci: Incarceration for philosophical subversiveness. This essentially requires you to have an audience that constitutes a subversive movement, and your existence is intellectually a major threat to the ideological authority.
De Sade: Incarceration for challenge to the philosophical and ideological stand of both the authority and the subversive counter authority. Best demonstrated when the subversives gain power and keep you incarcerated. (Admittedly De Sade was also partially imprisoned for apparent insanity).
Socrates: Incarceration for causing widespread philosophical and ideological ‘corruption’ in others.
There are easily examples of ‘Bertie’ rank issues that might see me imprisoned, such as if conscription were re-introduced. So yes there is philosophical protest that I might be imprisoned for.
For ‘Gramsci’ or higher, I’m not sure if there is a receptive audience or a cause to be championed that would actually cause enough threat to anyone outside a small number of academics who might get a bit hysterical out of boredom or to a small minority group who is about as significant as the philosopher in the greater scheme of things.
I ask now for people to offer some suggestions of believable possible scenarios that might allow for higher ranks to be achieved. So far I’m winning with ‘Bertie’ rank for conscription.
I agree that the question of what positions could get one thrown into jail is an apt one, and that there are few position that could get one incarcerated these days. Perhaps, for the sake of the discussion, it would be apt to establish a hypothetical world where holding the position would get you imprisoned, and consider the various positions in that context …
I am not so certain about your hierarchy, though. I can sort of agree with three of the types proposed – Bertie (Russell), Gramsci, and Socrates. I am not certain about de Sade, because it is either too cloudy to be a definitive type, or it is too close to Gramsci and Socrates. (This will become clearer in a moment.) Though I cannot agree with a four tiered hierarchy. I think that the types best support two tiers – a minor tier and a major tier. The minor tier consists of the Bertie type; the major tier of the Gramsci and Socrates types, which are distinguished primarily by the corruption division. (Thus, de Sade falls within Socrates – if his imprisonment was for his beliefs rather than his insanity).
I agree the hierarchy is dubious; the Sade category seemed redundant even when writing it, and it really does just reduce into the two categories. I just liked the idea of a sort of computer game, where you needed to obtained a certain rank based on your 'subversiveness' to either a) progress to the next level, or b) get your name in the high scores (something like '20/07/06 Minds corrupted: 127 name: RDB Rank: Gramsci').
That aside it does seem to fall into two categories 1) protest/conscience and 2) Subversive/corruption. There is probably no need to distinguish a receptive audience, nor the ability of continued influence while imprisoned to be factors, as they could legitimately be attributed to both, though for a 2nd category offence, there is something romantic about the smuggling out of subversive texts to a devoted readership that add the charm to Sade’s and Gramsci’s.
So, type 1)is easy to establish positions that one might a) be willing to go to gaol for, and b)has a realistic chance of such a state of affairs being such that one might exercise their dissent and be imprisoned, such as lying in front of a bulldozer or spray painting the opera house. These are probably not so much based in what philosophical views are held as they are acts of 'dissent'.
Type 2) is probably easy to establish scenarios where you might be willing to be imprisoned, e.g. if John Howard dissolved all political parties and became an autocrat outlawing all critical positions of him, but these are unlikely. These are based in an active intellectual threat to an authority.
If we live in a society in which it is relatively easy to be incarcerated for a type 1 offence, but almost unimaginable for a type 2, what does this say about the nature of intellectual activity within that society? One would say that it is a very open society which allows intellectual dissent. But does it not also say something about how ideas fail to cause adequate threat to authorities (intellectual/political/etc.) in such a society? What philosophical concepts could possibly gain mass to destabilise society enough to threaten an established authority? The stability and resilience to criticism that the current system provides to all entities seems as worrying as an inability to criticise at all.
There certanly is plenty of resilience in the current system. Coming up with a philosophical position of the 2. category that threatens authority seems to hit the following snag:
a)A position extreme/interesting enough to gain any attention will be grossly unfeasable, unspeakably 'evil' or totally impractical. Alternativley it will be portrayed in this way in the broader public discourse, either way it does not matter, the result is the same.
Therefore:
b)Any position that is mainstream enough to be taken seriously will be essentially the same as what is in the mainstream already, with minor variations at the most.
Broadly speaking there are two ways around this. You can seek to undermine the idea that once something passes a certain level of non-mainstreamness that it can't be taken seriously. (Tricky, but possible). However the idea that subversive or corrupt ideas can be taken seriously will probably be seen as subversive or corrupt(or both).
Or you can hide the dangerous ideas in things that seem ordinary and non-threatening - a kind of political/intellectual wolf in sheeps clothing. This Machiavellian approach seems more likely to me to succeed, until they find you out at least, then it all comes down to the brute clash of power.
This discussion could become more relevant depending on if (and how much) censorship is tightened.
A-G expects opposition to censorship push
(From www.abc.net.au/news/ )
Thinking about Sam's last comment a side question emerges - would you be prepared, if you were a muslim, to endure imprisonment for a fundamentalist belief?
‘Mr Ruddock claims the test should not be the legally tortuous requirement of demonstrating a publisher's intent to incite terrorism but whether words advocated terrorism.’ Taken from the Sydney Morning Herald, 28/07/06, on the new censorship changes that have been effectively granted to Mr Ruddock.
‘Words’ seem somehow insufficient to create a legal definition of ‘terrorist incitement’. I would have thought that any legal definition would require consideration of who the intended audience is and who the actual audience is. Would the intended audience see the article as incitement to terrorism? This implies a level of intention on behalf of the author. Does the actual audience use it in the way that was intended? I fear that this is a way of censoring that is to achieve a political agenda rather than further our democratic and liberal rights.
I wonder if words inciting hatred or violence against Muslims will also be banned under the same regulations.
Either way what happens to a book like ‘Platform’?
Could Mr Hill please track down for me what is the Australian legal definition of terrorism in relation to published materials.
Fundamentalism has an interesting element to it: the ability to form a cohesive and defined group. This means that fundamentalisms can effectively encounter and try to suppress other fundamentalisms. The act of critique seems to be ignorable by fundamental positions, with the only way to threaten one being to subscribe to a different fundamentalist stance. This is true for most revolutionaries, the governments they challenged/ousted, religious groups, etc. The way to get yourself incarcerated in Australia would be to challenge as a fundamentalist, our nationally supported fundamentalisms of Christianity and liberal democracy. Islam is the best one to take up at the current moment as it apparently erodes both. Communism is so not in.
In view of the two categories established (dissent/conscience and subversive/corruptive), and considering the 'philosophical' threat of fundamentalist Islam, does Islam qualify as a philosophical position?
If so, does David Hicks qualify as a subversive/corruptive philosophical prisoner?
Does this mean that essentially philosophic debate is only ever actually at the level of waring fundamentalisms?
Okay – I’ll try to answer the questions and clarify the issues involved.
Firstly, on the issue of incitement. At the outset, anything I am about to write is far from authority, and should not be taken as constituting legal advice. This is primarily because – as far as I am aware – there is only statute law at present, and the answer to the questions will probably lie in case as (and if) it develops, and secondarily, I’m not a qualified practitioner.
At issue in the quote from the article is what the relevant evidentiary test should be. There appear to be two proposed: a) proving a publisher’s intent to incite terrorism, or b) proving that the text advocated terrorism. As here stated, the relevant issue is the mental fault element. The a) test requires a prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the publisher of the text intended to incite terrorism. The b) test seems to require the proof that the publisher intended to print the text. It seems – as the article suggests – that a) would be a harder test to meet, given that it would require that the accused published be shown to have intended to both publish the text and to incite terrorism (or, presumably given the nature of the legislation that has thus far been enacted regarding terrorist offences, was reckless in regard to either of the elements).
Secondly, as to a definition of terrorism. Presently, as I understand it, terrorist offences within the federal jurisdiction fall under the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). Under s 100.1(1), and for the purposes of Part 5.3 – Terrorism, a terrorist act is defined as ‘an action or threat of action where: (a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subsection (3); and (b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and (c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of: (i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or (ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public.’ The referred to sub-sections set out various requirements and exclusions. So, given that the offence – according to the article – will be one of advocating terrorism in print, it seems likely that the definition in the Code will influence the definition set out in the offence. As to the nature of the definition, it seems like the sort of thing that will be tested and established by judgements.
So to some general comments. Firstly, I doubt that one needs to worry about works like ‘Platform’ which does not – on my reading of it – actually advocate terrorism. Likewise, Conrad’s ‘The Secret Agent’ remains safe, as it is arguably a condemnation of terrorism. Secondly, the audience is one the verge of complete irrelevance in these offences in terms of the provisions, though would be the sort of things that may be brought up during trial. Thirdly, inciting violence against Muslims is already an offence under s 80.2(5) of the Code (which is one of the hotly debated sedition provisions, and one which the ALRC has proposed maintaining if the provisions are further reformed).
I’m aware that this is long and dry, but there is no other way to treat it at present. Hopefully it answers the questions raised.
Having re-read my last comment, am not happy with it. Would delete it but there are parts worth keeping. Consider this a further disclaimer.
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